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Introduction
During the late 1990s, Information Technology (IT) accounted for a large and growing share of investment and contributed significantly to output growth, particularly in the United States. The diffusion of IT throughout the economy has improved economic efficiency and substantially increased productivity growth in the Unites States as well as in other OECD countries. Due to the impressive productivity performance of the US economy in the late 1990s, most of the recent research has been devoted to analyse the impact of IT (or ICT, including also Communication technologies) production and diffusion on US productivity growth (Oliner and Sichel, 2000; Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000) . The main message from these studies is that the US economy can be viewed in many respects as a technology and productivity "leader". If a new IT-based source of productivity growth is established in the US economy, this raises the potential for other countries to follow suit.
During the same period, IT investment has considerably increased in European countries as well, but this has not always been followed by an equivalent acceleration in productivity growth.
Moreover, the contribution of information technology to growth seems to be quite heterogeneous across European countries (van Ark et al., 2002) . Thus, it is crucial to investigate the record of European countries in adopting new technologies and reducing their IT gap vis-à-vis the US.
The aim of this paper is first to identify the stage of IT adoption in individual European economies, and then to analyse the determinants of IT investment in a panel of "representative" EU countries.
A brief review of the literature on IT diffusion and investment is presented in Section 2, which is based both on comparative and on country studies. In Section 3, we study the dynamics of IT investment expenditure in 15 European countries from 1992 until 2001 and, by means of a cluster analysis, we draw a picture of IT diffusion in Europe. By clustering the European countries according to their GDP shares of IT spending, we identify three groups fairly stable along the 1990s: fast, medium and slow adopters. In Section 4, we build an econometric equation of IT investment to be estimated with panel data on European economies over 1980-2001, both considering aggregate IT investment and disaggregating between hardware and software. Since most European countries have only recently started to collect data on investment in IT items, and for several countries these data are still unpublished, we choose one or two "representative" countries for each of the three groups mentioned before, and perform the econometric analysis for these countries. Section 5 discusses our econometric findings on the determinants of IT investment in Europe, while final remarks and suggestions for further research are discussed in Section 6.
ICT diffusion and investment: a brief review
Since the mid-1990s, that is almost a decade after the start of the "endogenous growth" debate, the so-called "New Economy" and its relations with growth have moved to the centre of the stage.
More and more researchers have started to study the conceptual links between the introduction of ICT and economic growth, and evaluate their quantitative effects on national accounts. One reason for this widespread interest has been the mounting attention to the "Computer productivity paradox", i.e. why productivity growth in the US had not been so strong in the 1980s and early 1990s despite the spread of ICT throughout the economy (Triplett, 1999) .
A number of interpretations have been provided for this paradox. First, there was (and possibly is) a measurement problem involved in the definition of the ICT sector itself, and then in the economic evaluation of the ICT goods. The problem is now apparently solved as the OECD provides an official definition of ICT, and ICT goods and services are evaluated taking account of their inner quality (in the US, with the tool of hedonic pricing; see Colecchia and Schreyer, 2001 , for an overview of such methodological issues).
Another interpretation draws on the definition of "productivity" and on the productivity dynamics postulated by New-Economy theorists. The distinction between the production and use of ICT is central in this case. According to a simple two-sector neoclassical framework, if we are to measure the growth contribution of technical progress in the sectors producing ICT, we have to compute total factor productivity in the ICT-producing industries, as in this case technical progress is associated with an outward shift of the production function. If alternatively we are to measure the impact of ICT utilization on the productivity of whole economy, we have to calculate the variation in average labour productivity associated with the economy-wide rise in ICT investment (see Stiroh, 2001a ). This distinction is fundamental, because the overall impact of ICT on per capita output crucially depends on which is the main channel of productivity improvement, and on the relative weight of the ICT sector vis-à-vis the rest of the economy. On the one hand, the contribution of technical progress is the smaller, the lower the relative weight of the ICT-producing sector. On the other hand, in order for the effects of the ICT investment channel to become visible, more time is required for the new capital goods to fully generate a strong and permanent effect on labour productivity. Both these features may contribute to explain the Computer productivity paradox.
A third interpretation has to do with productivity spillovers associated with ICT adoption. In this case as well, one can distinguish between spillovers due to the diffusion of technical progress from the ICT-producing sectors, and productivity spillovers due to the use of ICT in the rest of the economy (network externalities; technical complementarities with other innovations generating in other sectors, such as the aircraft industry). Moreover, productivity improvements stemming from the production or the utilization of ICT could reinforce each other, for instance through intense producer-customer relationships prompted by proximity (see Rosenberg, 1982) . Here again, measurement issue and the identification of the spillovers may partly explain the paradox mentioned before.
Empirical studies on the contribution of ICT to growth have flourished in the US in recent years, and the debate has eventually moved from a US-centred to an international dimension. In May 1999, the Economics Department of the OECD launched an ambitious two-year research project on "Sustainable growth and the New Economy", which has so far provided us with a great deal of comparative studies on the nature and dynamics of innovation-and information-based growth. The starting point of comparative studies is twofold. First, there is still evidence of a gap in the relevance of the ICT sector between continental Europe, on the one side, and the US and a few other industrial countries, on the other side (see for instance OECD, 2003) . Second, the growth performance of continental Europe and Japan has been worse than those of the US in the second half of the 1990s, although the ICT investment gap has been progressively closed during the decade (Schreyer, 2000) .
Even within Europe, laggards (Italy, Spain and to a lesser extent Germany and France) and fast adopters (the UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Finland) can be identified (van Ark et al., 2002) . However, once industrial economies are classified according to their ICT endowments, the question becomes:
Has the wedge between leaders and slow adopters been partially closed since the mid-1990s? For some ICT components the answer seems to be positive. According to Colecchia and Schreyer (2001) the annual rate of growth of IT investment at constant prices over 1995-2000, based on harmonised indexes, has been 32.4 percent in the US, 31.6 percent in France, 31.2 and 30.9 percent respectively in Italy and Germany. As a matter of fact, ICT expenditure rates are now close to 6 percent of GDP in Western Europe, with a strong catch-up effect vis-à-vis the US (Iammarino et al., 2001 ).
This brings us to the second topic mentioned in the Introduction. The US experienced a historically unprecedented period of growth during the 1990s, while the pace of economic growth has been (and is) sensibly slower in continental Europe. Of course, many factors contributed to these outcomes, including fiscal consolidation in Euroland, accommodative monetary policy in the US, structural differences in labour, product and financial markets across the Atlantic, the higher weight of R&D in the US economy relative to Europe. However, the estimated growth contribution of information technologies was substantial in the UK and Netherlands, and rapidly increasing in over the 1990s in main purpose is to make a first step towards a thorough identification of the sources of growth across industries, in order to comprehend more properly the contribution of new technologies to overall productivity in ICT-using and ICT-producing industries in France.
IT diffusion among European countries: a cluster analysis
In this section we draw a picture of the diffusion of IT investment expenditure across Europe over the period 1992-2001. We focus on Information Technologies excluding Communication equipment because the latter item includes a large share of rather "traditional" investment goods, whose behaviour in terms of investment functions and contribution to productivity growth is likely to be rather different than for IT. 2 In particular, we track the variability of the expenditure share of IT over GDP across 15 European countries plus the US. To study the variability of the IT/GDP ratio across countries and across time, we employ Ward's approach to the analysis of variance that allows us to evaluate the distance between clusters of countries (Everitt et al., 2001 ). This method minimizes the sum of squares of any two (hypothetical) clusters that can be formed at each step of the analysis, and therefore is consistent with a minimum-variance approach. We applied Ward's methodology both to the data for the whole period 1992-2001, and year-by-year data. Chart 1 displays the results we obtain when implementing Ward's algorithm on data for the entire period:
three groups of countries (slow, medium and fast IT adopters) are identified. Among the fast adopters, Sweden is associated with the highest IT/GDP ratio while among the slow adopters, Greece displays the lowest IT/GDP rate.
[ concern France, which ranks higher here than in other classifications, and Finland for which the opposite is true: notice however that our clusters are based on IT data which exclude Communication equipment and services, and that this may explain why France (Finland) performs better (worse) in our classification than in others.
Chart 2 shows the results we obtain year by year. It is interesting to note that during the whole period only few countries moved across groups. In particular, with the exception of Ireland that was classified as medium adopter in 1992 and as slow adopter in the following benchmark years, slow adopters and most of medium adopters (Austria, Finland, Belgium, Norway) maintained their original ranking over time. On the contrary, rankings among fast adopters shifted almost every year, although only Sweden moved from the medium into the fast adopters cluster over time. The next step is to search for common determinants of IT investment across European economies, and to identify key relationships that may account for the persistent differences they display in the rate of IT adoption (as proxied by the ratio of IT investment to GDP).
[Chart 2 about here]
The determinants of IT investment in European countries: empirical model and data
In order to move from the description of national patterns of IT accumulation to the analysis of the determinants of IT investment across European countries, we build an econometric model to be estimated with panel data for five representative EU countries over 1980-2001, where "representative" refers to the fact that at least one country for each of the three clusters identified above is included in the sample. The model we adopt is rather eclectic in that it combines features of standard models of aggregate investment with features we believe can usefully be applied to the specific case of IT investment choices.
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According to the Keynesian tradition, aggregate investment is modelled as a function of disposable income and the real interest rate; disposable income is in turn related to gross domestic product (see for instance Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981, chapter 14) . In our case, we estimate the share of IT investment over GDP and we normalize other variable with gross domestic product, hence we do not include disposable income among the explanatory variables. However, we do include a proxy for the (expectation of) growth of the size of the national market, the lagged rate of growth of GDP.
To account for country-specific financial conditions we use long-term real interest rates, lagged one year as their influence on IT investment is likely to occur after a time lag (this variable is common both to the Keynesian and to the Neoclassical approach to aggregate investment: see Blanchard and Fischer, 1989 , chapter 2). More recent theoretical and empirical approaches to business investment underline the key role of liquidity constraints in an environment characterized by widespread financial market imperfections. Liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs have to rely on retained profits as well as on credit flows to finance their investment plans (see for instance Fazzari et al., 1988) . In this case, higher profit shares in the distribution of GDP should be associated with higher investment rates. Other scholars point out to a different causal link, going from higher wage compensations to a more intense substitution of capital to labour inputs in the production function, hence to higher investment rates (see Daveri and Tabellini, 2000) . As the labour and the profit share (where the latter includes the compensation for capital services) are linked through the accounting identity of the distribution of national income, we use either aggregate labour costs (CPE, compensation per employee) or net operating surplus (NOS), both as shares of GDP. As in the case of the real interest rate, we include the lagged value of CPE/GDP or NOS/GDP, as financial conditions (or relative factor prices) are supposed to affect investment rates after a time lag. Unfortunately, most of these variables are hardly viable in our context, either because they are conceptually flawed when analysing the EU, or because data are difficult to collect and substantially unavailable on a yearly basis. Take for instance the price of IT goods: there should not be significant differences in such prices within the EU Internal Market, as in principle even nontariff barriers such as technical requirements for IT goods should not be so different across EU economies as to drive a price wedge. Quantifying risk and uncertainty related to the applications of new technologies is very difficult, and it is almost impossible to provide time series data on that.
More information has become recently available on the competitive and regulatory environment of 
Empirical findings
We first discuss the estimates of equation 1 using data for the investment in IT as a whole, and then provide separate estimates for investment in hardware and software. 8 As shown in the first column of Table 1 , our empirical equation fits yearly data on IT investment in the five EU countries rather well, although taken individually only some coefficients are statistically significant. The real interest rate has a negative coefficient as expected; the share of labour costs is negatively correlated with IT investment, supporting the financial constraint hypothesis against the labour-capital substitution conjecture. In order to test the financial constraint hypothesis more directly, in column two we re-estimate the equation using NOS instead of the aggregate labour share (CPE), and finding a weaker but still significant positive coefficient as expected. While the lagged growth rate of GDP tends to show a positive relation with IT investment, R&D intensity does not display a statistically significant relation with IT/GDP. Our measure of comparative advantage is instead positively and significantly correlated with the endogenous variable. In column three we experiment an alternative measure of R&D, but the results are not consistent with our a-priori.
If IT capital is complementary to skilled labour or to the share of scientists or technicians in the labour force, it might be the case that IT investment raises with the national level of higher education, or with the proportion of the labour force that has scientific or technical skills. We have controlled for a wide range of these variables in the regressions, but obtained no significant result.
Once again, this is possibly due to the poorness of our proxies, hence more research deserves to be undertaken in the direction of testing more refined measures of the skills required by IT investment.
[ Table 1 about here]
One possible reason why some of the variables included in equation 1 turn out not to be statistically significant is that they affect hardware and software investment in a different way: merging together the data on hardware and software may then be inappropriate. Table 2 on the determinants of investment in hardware supports this conjecture. Column one shows that all the variables included in equation 1 turn out to be significant in explaining hardware investment, and with the expected sign. More precisely, financial tightness has a negative impact, while growing domestic demand, a higher intensity of R&D and comparative advantage in the hardware sector, enhance the accumulation of hardware. In column two, instead of CPE we have used NOS which is associated with a positive but non-significant coefficient, while no remarkable differences arise for the other variables. In column three we test an alternative proxy for R&D, which yields results comparable with those in column one. Finally, in column four we check for complementarity between hardware and software, including lagged investment in software among the determinants of hardware investment. However, the data do not support the hypothesis that more investment in software command more investment in hardware the year after.
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[ Table 2 about here]
In the case of software investment, Table 3 shows that while the set of financial proxies behaves consistently with the assumption, this is not true of the other variables (see column one). The proxy for the (expectation of) domestic demand dynamics is not significant, R&D intensity exerts a negative effect on software investment, while our proxy for comparative advantage seems to play no role in determining EU patterns of software investment. Using NOS instead of CPE makes the coefficient of EXP/IMP significant, but worsen that of the interest rate (column two), while testing a different measure of R&D does not alter the picture (column three). Interestingly, lagged expenditure in hardware has a positive and significant effect on software investment (column four).
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[ Table 3 about here]
Taken together, Tables 1-3 suggest that: -the real interest rate has a negative coefficient as expected, and also the share of labour costs is negatively correlated with IT investment, pointing out to a negative effect of financial tightness on IT investment. This is true also in the case of hardware and software investment taken separately;
-these results are robust once net operating surplus is included instead of labour costs (of course NOS has a positive coefficient), but only in the case of aggregate IT and software;
-growing domestic demand, a higher intensity of R&D and comparative advantage enhance the accumulation of hardware;
-in the case of software investment, only the set of financial proxies behaves consistently with the theoretical assumptions. R&D intensity displays a negative relation, while the coefficients of domestic demand and comparative advantage tend to be estimated less precisely. Software investment does respond positively to lagged hardware accumulation.
An explanation for these results for software investment could be that sectors with a low R&D intensity tend to invest relatively more in software than in hardware (for instance, this could be the case of some service sectors such as business services, see for instance, Tomlinson 2001). If this is the case, a rise in software investment need not be positively correlated with an increase in the share of R&D expenditure. As for comparative advantage, it is likely that producer-customer relationships 10 Even for software, education and skill variables turn out to be not significant.
prompted by proximity are more relevant for investment in hardware than in software, which could explain the poor performance of EXP/IMP as a RHS variable in Table 3 .
Conclusions and hints for future research
In Financial conditions, income growth and comparative advantage turn out to affect IT investment, but the determinants of hardware and software investments differ considerably. On the one hand, the real interest rate has a negative coefficient as expected, and also the share of labour costs is negatively correlated with IT investment. This is true also in the case of hardware and software investment taken separately. On the other hand, growing domestic demand, a higher intensity of R&D and comparative advantage enhance the accumulation of hardware, but this is not in general true for software. In the case of R&D intensity, software investment displays a negative relation.
Moreover, software investment does respond positively to lagged hardware accumulation, while the converse in not true.
A possible explanation for the peculiar results for software investment is that sectors with a low R&D intensity tend to invest relatively more in software than in hardware (for instance, this could be the case of some service sectors such as business services). If this is the case, a rise in software investment need not be positively correlated with an increase in the share of R&D expenditure. As for comparative advantage, it is likely that producer-customer relationships promped by proximity are more relevant for investment in hardware than in software. In any case, more research deserves to be made to investigate the specific determinants of investment in different categories of IT goods.
There are two other dimensions of the determinants of IT investment where more analysis is strongly require: first, in the direction of obtaining more refined measures of regulatory and competition intensity that can be usefully applied to the case of IT investment; and second, in the direction of testing more refined measures of the education attainments and labour skills required by IT diffusion.
ICT capital goods
Hardware: (30010) manufacture of office and accounting machinery and (30020) manufacture of computing machinery.
Software: (72200) Software consultancy and supply; (72300) data processing; (72400) data base activities; (72500) maintenance and repair of office, accounting and computing machinery; (72601) services of telematics, robotics, computer graphics; (72602) other computer related activities.
Communication equipment: (32100) manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components; (32201) manufacture of television and radio transmitters; (32202) manufacture of apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy; (32203) repairing of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy; (32300) manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus, and associated goods; (33201) manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring. 
